This study investigates the legitimacy of the relatively high interest rates charged by those microfinance institutions (MFIs) which have been transformed into regulated commercial banks using information garnered from a panel of 1232 MFIs from 107 developing countries.
INTRODUCTION
The global microfinance movement has received intense media attention in the past decade.
This has thrown the spotlight on two key concerns. The first is the high interest rates charged by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by comparison with formal sector commercial banks, raising allegations of monopolistic pricing (Rosenberg et al, 2009; Yunus, M, 2011) . The second is related to fears of "mission drift" as many MFIs transform into regulated profit maximizing banks with a consequent re-orientation in their services towards the better-off among their poor clients in order to achieve financial self-sufficiency (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Frank, 2008; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010; Mersland and Strøm 2010 and Roberts, 2013) .
In the early years, pioneers in microfinance lauded the promise of providers to reduce poverty and engineer social change in communities by lending to and collecting savings deposits from extremely poor households which lack the collateral to secure loans from formal-sector commercial banks. However, in the recent past, some advocates of microfinance as a development strategy have embraced the idea that the opportunity to achieve a sustainable large-scale programme lies in approaches which encourage MFIs to adopt traditional banking practices with related regulatory requirements, even if this entails charging higher cost-covering interest rates (Churchill and Frankiewicz, 2006; Ledgerwood et al, 2006; Sundaresan, 2008; Cull et al, 2008 and 2009) . Such formalisation should instil confidence in the system and attract capital to fund investments in technology, equipment and staff training (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) . Moreover, Robinson (2001) , Drake and Rhyne (2002) , Dehejia et al (2007) advocate that the integration of micro financial services into the formal sector should enhance the growth and capability of MFIs to provide a higher quality of products including larger loans to an ever-growing number of beneficiaries around the world without a continuing reliance on subsidies.
Ultimately the interplay between the characteristics of MFIs and the nature of the aforementioned concerns in the debate is an empirical matter. Unfortunately, these important issues have remained largely untested, primarily because of a lack of variation in the pattern of interest rates charged by different institutions. In this paper, we resolve this difficulty by using a panel framework comprising 1232 financially self-sufficient MFIs from 107 countries across six developing regions from the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) MFIs substantially lowered the average interest rates reported in previous studies.
Nonetheless, Cull et al (2009) found that the correlation between financial outcomes in terms of operationally self-sufficiency (OSS) and financial self-sufficiency (FSS) is positively significant at circa 0.89. Such a high correlation, although not perfect, indicates that the two measures of financial performance are somewhat interchangeable.
This study contributes to the microfinance empirical literature in two ways.
First, it investigates whether the annual average interest rates observed for financially self-sufficient (FSS) microfinance institutions with the legal entitlement to conduct traditional banking activities are significantly higher than the rates charged by MFIs with a different charter status. We differentiate between the interest rate income of rural and other Second, statistics show that MFIs which are classified as financially self-sufficient institutions by MIX analysts tend to be older with larger levels of lending. We therefore investigate the interaction between interest rates, scale economies and years of experience of microcredit providers. The outcome of this analysis should help reveal the extent to which policy actions which promote the learning which comes from years of practice and growth in the scale of an institution's loan operations are likely to be more effective pricing strategies than initiatives which encourage microfinance institutions to transform into banks.
The paper is organised into four sections. Section I provides an overview of annual average interest rates of those financially self-sufficient MFIs which were consistently reported in the MIX developing country database from 2005 to 2010. We further compare the variation in these annual average interest rates for selected MICROBANKs versus those of NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions. Section II outlines the empirical research model, hypotheses 
I. Data Description
Our argument here is conducted under: (i) sample selection, (ii) sample distribution and (iii) microcredit interest rates.
1.1: Sample Selection
In this section, we summarise the pattern in the actual annual average interest income earned by our different types of financially self-sufficient MFIs of different age and scale between 2005 and 2010 using a standard descriptive statistical method. The choice of time-span considered is limited by the availability of time series data on interest yield and its four major components -cost of funds, operating costs, loan loss provision rate and profits 4 .The information on these variables is obtained from the MIX website only so as to ensure conformity and reliability in their measurement. Notwithstanding these benefits, Cull et al (2007) , Gonzalez (2007) , Cotler and Almazan (2013) and Nwachukwu (2013a) expressed concern regarding the self-selection bias inherent in the MIX dataset. They noted that the more successful MFIs with adequate information systems are more likely than others to expose their private financial accounts to external examination and to satisfy the minimum requirements of auditing firms and MIX analysts. In an anticipatory variation of the uncertainty principle, the knowledge that they will be closely observed by financial analysts, will further improve the quality of their submission. Nevertheless, the MIX database is commonly used in the microfinance empirical literature on the assumption that those institutions which report to the organisation collectively serve a sufficiently large fraction of active microcredit users worldwide.
Annual data on interest yield and its above-mentioned four key components is available for 1232 sustainable micro lenders located in 107 countries throughout our six developing regions. These comprise those institutions reporting on these crucial variables for at least three out of the six years of study. Given the time period considered and the number of data points which these institutions reported to MIX, we were able to generate an unbalanced cross section-time series panel data of 3980 observations. Appendix Table 1 reports the mean for all the variables which underlie our analysis for our five classes of MFIs subdivided across their age and scale of their lending operations.
1.2: Sample Distribution
Figures 1A and 1B show the distribution of our dataset across the different types of our sustainable microcredit providers, as well as in terms of their age and scale of operations in that order. Figure 1A shows that our sample of study is dominated by NGOs and NBFIs.
Collectively, these supposedly socially-orientated MFIs make up two-thirds of our sample.
The fact that these MFIs form the largest proportion of our dataset, and by inference that of the microfinance sector as a whole, should not be a surprise. This indicates that the recent concentration on microbanks in the media does not merit their relative importance.
As shown in Figure 1B , the majority of financially-viable NGOs are mature, small to medium scale programmes with gross profit margin in excess of 40 percent. By contrast, more than half of our NBFIs, which may include registered moneylenders, micro-insurance firms, micro-equity institutions, pawn shops, payday lenders, check cashing firms and currency exchanges, are probably new initiatives which have mostly been set up in the past five years by large-scale institutions. Their profit margins are evenly spread across our chosen three sub-samples of profitability. This is probably an indication of the wide diversity of type and number of institutions, financial contracts, products and services offered.
1.3: Microcredit Interest Rates
The yield on microloans (YLD) is calculated by MIX analysts as the sum of all interest, fees and commissions actually received by an MFI weighted by the size of its outstanding gross loan portfolio (GLP) averaged over the period of study. Figures 2A and 2B show the annual average interest income earned by our financially viable MFIs reported by the type, age and scale of their operations respectively. We use nominal rather than real interest yield in order to capture the higher risk of defaults, costs of administration and other complications faced by MFIs which charge the comparatively high interest rates which cover inflation. In any event, as observed by Woller and Schreiner (2002) , the nominal portfolio yield is highly positively correlated with the real yield. Thus, nominal rather than real portfolio yield is widely used in the literature as a proxy for the actual interest rate charged on loans.
The statistics in both figures 2A and 2B indicate that the annual average interest income for a typical financially self-sufficient MFI in the MIX developing country database (hereafter referred to as MIX-MFI) was 32.86 percent of gross loan portfolios (GLP) outstanding. This is comparable with the mean real gross portfolio yield of 35.4 percent reported by Cull et al (2007) .
A disentangling of data by type of MFI shows a wide variation in the average interest rate charged. Contrary to popular belief, the highest average interest rates of between 34.31 percent and 36.58 percent per annum were observed for NGOs and NBFIs in that order. This is presumably because NGOs and NBFIs are expected to lend to the poorest households without collateral and so have higher premium for risk. Moreover, these deprived clients borrow in small amounts and therefore also have greater unit administration costs, not to mention the cost of foreign and vehicles employment by NGOs in particular. Besides, these underprivileged borrowers may be more concerned with access to capital rather than "cheap" loans. They therefore could be unresponsive to price increases, permitting those MFIs which purport to serve them to offer credit at considerably high interest rates. What is more, the absence of effective regulation and public scrutiny may have allowed such institutions to charge interest rates which are significantly higher than their average costs, compared with microfinance banks which often attract intense media attention and possible censure. Thus, decisions on whether sustainable NGOs and NBFIs are meeting their professed social obligations must be based on the presumption that any subsequent relatively high profits are channelled into initiatives which ultimately reduce average interest charges. Figure 1B , are mostly mature small scale operations.
They are therefore more likely to offer more personalised customer services to users and to know more about the creditworthiness of their borrowers.
Another discernible pattern across the MFIs in Figures 2A Generally speaking, two key issues emerge from our summary statistics in this section. First, there is an indication that a quicker way to lower microcredit rates is for providers, especially those in the newly established non-bank financial sector, to pay closer attention to those costs which tend to fall with the scale of lending operations. Such scale economies arising from lending to more clients and/or by increasing the value, duration and range of borrowing facilities offered to existing clients with a good credit history would make the provision of microcredit more efficient. Second, the effect of age and scale economies appears to be closely correlated, especially for the NBFI category. This outcome is almost certainly a consequence of the fact that it takes time to understand and exploit opportunities for cost efficiencies embodied in large scale microcredit operations. The implication is that an interaction term which combines MFI's age and scale of lending over time should be included in any empirical study which claims to investigate the effect of the two variables on interest charges. The regression model which we employ in this study to analyse how age and scale economies affect annual interest rates of selected operationally self-sufficient MFIs in the MIX developing country database is outlined in the next section.
Empirical Model and Hypotheses
The argument in this section is carried out under the following headings: (i) model specification, (ii) variables of interest, (iii) control variables and expected relationships and (iv) empirical estimation method.
2.1: Model Specification
This paper investigates how financially self-sufficient microfinance institutions may influence their interest revenue through: (i) the adoption of traditional banking practices, (ii) knowledge acquired by serving clients over time and (iii) scale economies achieved by serving a growing number of borrowers and/or by increasing the average size and duration of a loan. The model which we use to capture the influence of these three characteristics of MFIs on interest rates can be expressed in terms of the following regression equation.
The variable YLD was defined previously in section 1.3 as the gross loan portfolio yield on microloans.
2.2: Variables of Interest
The independent variables of particular interest comprised: (i) the entry MATURE is a dichotomous dummy variable indicating the number of years the institution has been operating. Following the classification by MIX analysts, this variable takes a value 0 if the institution has less than eight years of operation and 1 otherwise. The decision to merge the NEW (i.e., age < 5 years) and the YOUNG (i.e., age between 5 and 8 years) variables to create a "NEW-YOUNG" dummy series follows from a lack of sufficient observations for each individual category in our dataset. We differentiate between interest charges borne by borrowers from mature-mediumlarge scale microbanks versus NEW-YOUNG microbanks, by introducing an interaction term (MATURE*MSCALE*LSCALE*MICROBANK). We predict that the differential slope is negative in recognition of the fact that mature-medium-large microbanks are more likely to have improved governance and internal controls and to be better at coping with the risk and cost associated with regulation and its supervision. Such should instil confidence in external finance providers and depositors, leading to a lower cost of funding with a corresponding fall in interest charges. Also, it is expected that established large microbanks have acquired the experience and scale economies needed to manage and price microcredit risk better. They should therefore have lower cost structures with an associated decline in their interest rates.
2.3: Control Variables and Expected Relationships
The symbol in equation 2 is a vector comprising the set of control variables drawn from a pool of potential determinants theoretically or empirically linked to changes in interest rates on microloans in the microfinance literature. Generally speaking, discussions by Christen (2000), Woller and Schreiner (2010) indicated that several empirical studies which use the MBB dataset have consistently found the following ten institutional characteristics to be important drivers of interest rates on microbanking loans aside from the age and scale variables described in section 2.2. These ten conditioning variables have been added simultaneously to our extended regression in equation 2.
The first information-conditioning variable is FELR, measured as the ratio of the cost of funds to gross loan portfolio for an MFI. The coefficient captures the effect on microcredit rates of policies affecting the terms and the amount providers pay for their funds. A tightening in the terms, conditions and diversity of funding sources would raise the average finance-expense ratio, causing a rise in interest rates. This implies a positive coefficient.
The second variable, OPER, is the ratio of operating expenses to gross loan portfolio.
This is used to proxy the efficiency with which an MFI delivers its loans to its clients. We would expect that sustainable MFIs with higher operating cost structures would charge higher interest rates. This suggests that the coefficient will have a positive sign. Nevertheless, Campion et al (2010) and Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) out that profitable MFIs are more likely to invest in initiatives needed to improve the quality and range of services provided to both existing and as yet un-served clients. Any subsequent reduction in costs should contribute to lowering interest rates in the long-term, leading to a negative coefficient. Besides, those MFIs which raise profit targets are normally subjected to public pressure to cut their microcredit interest rates. Fear of such concerted civic protests has resulted in a fall in interest rates in the past. Consequently, the sign on the coefficient cannot be ascertained a priori.
The quality of an institution's loan portfolio is measured by our fifth control variablePAR30. This is the proportion of an MFI's loans that have one or more principal instalments unpaid for more than thirty days past their due date. Thus, a rise in this variable indicates a deterioration in the quality of an MFI's loan portfolio. We theorise that MFIs with poor portfolio quality are unable to contain their costs, leading to higher interest rates. This implies a positive sign on the coefficient .
The sixth variable in our conditioning set is, WBR. This represents the proportion of women borrowers which supposedly captures the depth of outreach to the underprivileged population by an MFI (Woller and Schreiner, 2002) . Evidence shows that socially-oriented MFIs tend to serve a greater fraction of females than males, primarily to overcome cultural biases against females (Cull et al, 2007; Campion et al, 2010) . Further, women are normally targeted by programmes with pro-poor goals because women are more likely to spend earnings from their microbusiness on their family's welfare, including their children's education, nutrition and health (ILO, 2008; Campionet al, 2010) . However, women also tend Christen et al, 2003) . Such extra costs will be passed on to customers through higher interest rates. A negative relationship, on the other hand, suggests that, on average, our MFIs used the proceeds from newly issued equity capital to recapitalise by repurchasing outstanding debt in order to meet a required capital adequacy ratio regulation. Any subsequent reduction in the likelihood of bankruptcy should lower the cost of funding with an associated decline in interest rates. This means that the sign on the may not be confirmed beforehand.
The ninth variable, ALPBP, is the average loan size per borrower relative to the per capita GNI of the country in which the institution is located. The smaller the average loan size, the larger the probable fraction of the poorest borrowers served by the institution. In fact, information from MIX indicates that socially-oriented MFIs which cater for the financial needs of deprived borrowers at the low-end of the credit market tend to make small-sized loans of less than 20 percent of the per capita GNI of the country in which they operate. But because each loan application goes through a similar cost of vetting process, we expect that total operating costs with their associated interest rates will be higher for MFIs with more outstanding small loans than their counterparts with fewer, larger credits. Thus, a positive correlation coefficient could be expected if those institutions most focused on a social mission charged higher interest rates to offset the greater unit transaction costs of providing an increased number of small average loan amounts to disadvantaged borrowers.
The final variable in our conditioning set is ALPBPSQ. This is the square of an average loan-size per borrower per capita GNI used as a proxy for an institution's outreach to the wealthier borrowers capable of servicing larger loan sizes. The decision to include this quadratic term follows from the observation by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) that the greatest challenge facing most MFIs is how to recompense for the high fixed cost of lending in small amounts. Cotler and Almazan(2013) noted that most financially self-sustaining MFIs, especially those which operate in countries where rates are capped, are tempted to deal with this concern by re-orientating their services towards wealthier borrowers with the capacity to service larger loans. Evidence shows that the consequent lower costs are passed on to borrowers in the form of lower interest charges. Further, MFIs that make larger loans are more likely to want their borrowers to pledge collateral which, in turn, lowers interest rates. Moreover, if larger loans are made progressively to the more experienced and educated class of borrowers with successful businesses, then the operational costs and the risk of default should decline and with them interest rates. We would therefore expect to find a negative correlation coefficient between interest rates and the squared-average loan size variable.
The symbol is a dummy variable representing the effects of those unobserved characteristics which are unique to a particular MFI and which do not vary over time .
These institution-specific dummies are treated as either fixed or random parameters depending on the outcome of a test proposed by Hausman (1978) 5 . The symbol is a dummy variable for time. These time indices are also treated as fixed or random in order to capture the dynamic changes in the rate of interest over our six years of study. The notation is the white noise disturbance term with an expected value of zero.
2.4: Empirical Estimation Method
To test the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses on the relationship between nominal interest income and its key determinants, we employ two estimation techniques. The first is a basic correlation analysis which considers the degree of linear association between interest rates and each individual control variable. We estimate the Kendall tau rank correlation This is to be expected as these variables represent the institutional features which managers seek to influence in order to achieve optimal pricing for their niche market. Thus, the treatment of these variables as exogenous in a number of articles, including the influential Least Squares (2SLS).The perennial problem of choosing valid instruments from freely available data is resolved by employing two period lagged values of all the variables in our conditioning set. Ideally, the restrictions placed on the choice of appropriate instruments and lag lengths should be informed by financial and economic theories. But often these theories are at best vague or at worst non-existent. As a result, searching for exogenous variables to be used as instruments in simultaneous specifications has been carried out in an ad hoc manner.
It has been argued that the measurement error associated with such an unplanned selection of external instruments could be minimised by using the VAR approach (Sims, 1980; McNees, 1986) . With respect to lag lengths, our priority was to include as many cross-sections of MFIs as possible in our regression analysis while ensuring that each of these institutions has data for at least three out of our six years.
We recognise that the components of our regression equation which are expressed at natural logarithm levels may contain unit roots and so should have been differenced to induce stationarity. Nonetheless, the resolution to run the regression at level follows from the fact that the objective of this article is to examine the relationship between interest rates and key MFI characteristics. Differencing would have resulted in a loss of any long-run information on the correlation between these variables. In any event, the influence of non-stationarity on the behaviour and properties of data is less pronounced for our panel dataset which comprises a large cross section of 1232 operationally self-sufficient MFIs with a relatively short-term time period of six years. Besides, the transformation of all the regressors into natural logarithm series helps to lessen the problem of spurious regression by ensuring that the variables follow a linear trend and are integrated (Asteriou and Hall, 2007, Brooks, 2008) .
The problem of multicollinearity is a key concern in multiple regression models. But, results in Appendix Table 2 indicate that the degree of interdependence between our explanatory variables is relatively low at under 0.5. Indeed, multicollinearity is rarely a problem in dynamic panels which pool a large cross-section of institutions from different countries over a relatively short-time period. Such a data arrangement reduces the likelihood that the same common trend will be prevalent in the regressors in the model specification.
Estimation Results
This section presents our empirical results under (i) correlation and (ii) regression analysis.
3.1: Correlation Analysis
Appendix Table 2 Contrary to expectation, the sign on the coefficient for the average loan balance per capita GNI is negative. We may therefore infer that the majority of our financially selfsufficient MFIs have not crossed the cut-off point at which potential gains from larger loans are lost. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that many profitable MFIs now employ the so-called "credit-plus" approach. This involves the provision of additional business development services, including health, consultancy, marketing and record keeping instructions to borrowers in order to enhance the size and productivity of the loans provided.
Surprisingly, interest income is inversely correlated with the proportion of loans that have passed their due date by thirty days. This unexpected outcome is consistent with the allegation that the LPAR30 series is a conservative measure of portfolio quality (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) . The inclusion of all principal instalments unpaid after a month of their expected date ignores the benefits of missed balances that are eventually repaid. Then too, the worsening in the risk of default as signalled by a rise in this variable does not account for the fact that MFIs have a good knowledge of their customers and their business environment.
They are therefore able to discern when non-repayment is due to genuine hardship, rather than shirking. A significant negative coefficient for the LPAR30 variable suggests that when loan default is proven to be due to a real deterioration in the financial circumstances of their clients, our typical MFI may have elected to restructure or reschedule the terms of lending either through a cut in interest rate or an extension of the repayment period. The decision not to punish those honest clients who have fallen on hard times with higher rate charges is probably in recognition of the original social mission of the microfinance movement.
Another unexpected result in Appendix Table 2 
3.2: Regression Analysis
The outcomes of our estimation for equations 1 and 2 using the 2SLS method are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 3 in that order. The regression in Column 2 highlights how the sign, size and statistical significance of the coefficients on our key variables of interest -age, scale economies and microbanking dummies-vary with the concurrent inclusion of our choice of conditioning variables. It is noteworthy that the regression in Column 2, has the highest adjusted R-squared and F-statistic. Besides a Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.04 indicates a lack of first-order serial correlation in the disturbance terms.
Consequently, much of our argument here is based on the estimates from the regression presented in Column 2. The discussion is organised under: (i) age, scale and microcredit interest rates, (ii) microbanking and (iii) other MFI characteristics 3.2.1. Age, scale and microcredit interest rates: The results in Appendix Table 3 indicate that the relationship between age, economies of scale and interest rates is sensitive to our set of conditioning variables simultaneously included in the regression model. For example, we reported in Column 1, that, on average, a mature MFI with more than eight years of experience has a marginally higher average portfolio yield than new-young institutions, even if this finding is weak from a statistical viewpoint. In Column 2, the coefficient on the age variable (i.e., MATURE) reverted to the expected negative sign, although the MATURE dummy is still statistically insignificant. Most likely, this negative correlation is capturing the cost-reducing effect of a movement along a learning curve over time. As noted by Cull et al Given the probable bias in the size of the MFIs that comprise our sample, we investigate the extent to which the age of operation could also be an influential factor on the relationship between scale and interest rates. The significant negative sign of the coefficient on the interaction terms MATURE*MSCALE and MATURE*LSCALE in our basic regression in Column 1 is consistent with the null hypothesis in Section 2.1, even if the coefficients were later found to be insignificantly different from zero at the conventional five percent level in the extended regression in Column 2. Nevertheless, we may infer that wellestablished medium-large scale MFIs have slightly lower annual average interest rates than new-young small ones. Older MFIs have learned how to structure their loan sizes and pricing policy to the credit history as well as the income-expenditure stream of their clientele. This has allowed our mature-medium-large institutions to marginally extend the cut-off point beyond which gains from economies of scale are predicted to dissipate. Nonetheless, we may infer from the statistically insignificant positive coefficients on the microbanking interaction terms that only a few well-established large microbanks were able to adequately raise their interest rates to cover the extra cost of this transformation.
Microbanking and microcredit interest rates:

Other MFI characteristics and microcredit interest rates:
Analysis of our regression model in Column 2 identified five out of our ten control variables as statistically significant drivers of interest rates at the conventional five-percent level.
The significantly positive correlation coefficients which were estimated for the two cost components of interest rates -cost of funds (LFELR) and operating cost (LOPELR), are consistent with our prediction.
The positive sign of the net profit variable (LPRFTLR) is statistically significant.
Contrary to the claim by Rosenberg et.al (2009) , the relatively large size of this coefficient suggests that the quest for profits is the most important reason for the differences in the lending interest rates among financially self-sufficient MFIs. A one percentage point increase in anticipated net profit per unit of loan portfolio will raise nominal portfolio yield by 0.14 percent, after accounting for the impact of the other regressors in the equation specifications.
The results also show that the size of the coefficients on the profit variable is nearly double that for each of our unit cost components. This indicates that sustainable MFIs, in their search for profit maximisation, raise interest rates by almost twice that of associated increases in the total unit cost of lending. Such may be taken as evidence of "mission drift" unless we presume that the higher profit is re-invested in the expansion of outreach to underserved poorer communities.
The entries in Column 2 indicate that the borrowers per staff ratio (LBPSR) is the only other control variable whose relationship with interest income is statistically significantly at the five percent level. Most notably, we found that contrary to the pecking order capital structure theory, interest rates charged by MFIs that use the more expensive external equity capital to finance larger loans is comparable to those charged by their counterparts that rely on internally generated funds such as retained profit. In line with this finding, we may therefore surmise that there is little or no risk that microcredit interest rates will be raised as more and more MFIs shift their funding structures towards purely commercial investment in the wake of the on-going budgetary problems faced by western donor governments.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The objective of this paper has been to discover how interest rates charged by financially An important public policy initiative for reducing the price of lending which may be adduced from these results are that governments should encourage the older and more efficient MFIs to increase institutional scale by merging and/or acquiring new-young MFIs.
In addition, the authorities should promote campaigns in the media and within the institutions themselves to disseminate lessons learned by mature providers. Furthermore, MFIs with less than eight years of experience can mitigate their cost disadvantages by investing in market surveys to gather client opinion on various aspects of the services which they have received (Campion et al, 2010) . Then too, staff of nascent MFIs in particular may be trained on how to use new technologies, such as credit scoring to collect, record and use information on client credit risk profiles to determine the charge on, and amount of loan extended to each borrower. These initiatives should help new-young MFIs to leapfrog the difficulties associated with the early stages of a learning curve.
Second, the robustness of the positive sign of the MICROBANK dummy suggests that the shift from socially-orientated to fully regulated micro-banking status typically leads to higher interest rates for customers of banks of all ages and scales. The inference is that such a transformation imposes extra costs on microbanks and that these expenses are eventually passed onto their customers.
Broadly speaking, our findings indicate that policy makers could lower the average interest rates for microbanks by reforming the prudential regulatory framework which this class of MFI is required to follow. Ideally, an effective regulatory structure for monitoring the activities of microbanks should take into account the differences in the size of their collateralised loan portfolios and client risk profiles vis-à-vis that of traditional commercial banks which are often bigger and employ more innovative technologies. Such a revision should ensure that compliance is not so burdensome and expensive that it leads to higher interest rates and/or limits the number of available microbanks which provide financial services to the poorest population. Then too, a government could offer financial assistance and technical advice to microbanks to facilitate their transformation into regulated entities.
Microfinance banks themselves may help mitigate the adverse effect of regulatory costs by expanding the range of products offered to clients in different target markets. Crosssubsidization of expenses from various market segments and products could be used to lower interest rates to the poorest clients (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009) .Raising staff productivity is another practice which may help lower the cost of transition to formal microbanking.
Policy initiatives which link incentive systems with staff bonuses and training needs to recognisable performance targets, such as the collection of savings deposits and loan repayments from clients, should help improve staff morale and efficiency. Besides, microbanks might invest in modern technologies such as internet and telephone banking in order to lower their operating costs per borrower. Microbanks can further lower transaction costs by using mobile vans to reach more low-income clients in remote rural areas rather than setting up branches there. Moreover, hiring local officers with a specialised knowledge of the culture and locality in which borrowers live and work should help improve ease of access to, and communication with borrowers, but this will, of course, be done at a cost.
Third,the pursuit of higher profit goals by sustainable MFIs, regardless of legal status, raises interest rates by almost double any corresponding upturn in the unit cost of lending.
Such may be taken as evidence of "mission drift", indicating that profit-driven shareholders are using their involvement to exert pressure on the pricing policy of MFIs.
The fear that financially self-sufficient MFIs are deviating from their original mission may be reduced by policies which encourage profit earned to be re-invested in the institution itself rather than distributed to shareholders or management. Such policy actions may include an increase in taxes levied on profits which are not re-invested in welfare maximisation initiatives. Additionally, concerns about excessive profit targets could be dealt with by implementing policies which foster competition in the microfinance sector. These initiatives may involve the setting up of a regulator which overseas accountability and transparency in the recording and timely publication of the audited accounts of MFIs, dividend payments and the names of their recipients. Also, the creation of independent price comparison websites and agencies which rank the performance of MFIs on the core principles of investor and borrower protection should increase the confidence of depositors, shareholders and other providers of funding to MFIs. Then too, governments should try to set-up an identity system for its citizens together with associated credit rating bureaus to facilitate the collection and comparison of the profile of borrowers. This should provide incentives for participation in the provision on microloans by the more socially-minded MFIs and lower interest rates. Further, the authorities could take out advertisements in national newspapers, on television, Notes:(i) Asterisks *,**,*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. No asterisk means that the coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
Appendix
(ii) Definitions of variables and expected effects on interest income are provided in Section 2.2 in the text (iii) An L in front of a variable's name is for the natural logarithm. The measures of adjusted equity-to-asset ratio (LECAR) were expressed as the natural logarithm of one plus the respective variables in order to reduce the range of variation and surmount the problems associated with negative observations. According to MIX, the equity variable is adjusted for donations and other forms of subsidies(iv) Data is taken from the website of the MIX market at: www.mixmarket.com
